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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

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November 13, 2023

The Honorable Christine Wormuth
Secretary of the Army
U.S. Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Wormuth,

Home to 170,000 Americans, Guam is the westernmost point of the United States. Critically for our military, the island hosts Naval Base Guam – the Navy’s only submarine base in the western Pacific – as well as Anderson Air Force Base – a large air base that is able to host strategic bombers and fighters. With over 20,000 U.S. troops stationed on the island, Guam will play an essential role in the defense of American allies and interests in the region. But despite its strategic importance, Guam remains highly vulnerable to an increasingly sophisticated network of missiles from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), especially its cruise missiles.

The PRC, to which Guam is much closer in distance than it is to Hawaii, has spent decades developing both short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that can target Guam and U.S. airfields in Japan as well as U.S. aircraft carriers and warships operating in the western Pacific.¹ The PRC has also developed a formidable inventory of highly capable cruise missiles that can be launched from multiple platforms, including from ships, submarines, and bombers.

While the United States has developed sea and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities and sufficient sea-based cruise missile defense capabilities, it has significant gaps in capabilities to defend against PRC cruise missiles attacking land-based targets such as Guam.² Such deficiencies put at grave risk our ability to use Guam as a vital submarine port and base to support operations in any contingency with the PRC.

¹ Mark Montgomery, Riki Ellison, and Bradley Bowman, “Guam Needs Better Missile Defenses – Urgent,” *Defense One*, May 23, 2022, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/guam-needs-better-missile-defensesurgently/367275/>.

² RADM (Ret) Mark Montgomery, “Baker’s Dozen: Thirteen Recommendations to Improve Deterrence in the Western Pacific,” *Congressional Testimony to the Select Committee on China*, Apr. 26, 2023, <https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/04-26-23-CCP-Montgomery-Written-Testimonyv4.pdf>.

The Army's ground-based missile defense system designed to defend against cruise missiles – the Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 (“IFPC Inc 2”) – has been encountering substantial delays. In 2021, the Army selected Dynetics to develop a launcher prototype for IFPC Inc 2, which is to be paired with the ground-launched AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. Although Dynetics was scheduled to deliver the first launcher prototype by September 2022, it was unable to do so as a result of supply chain issues.³ In May 2023, an Army program spokesman stated that the launcher prototypes were planned to be delivered by September (the end of the fourth quarter of FY23).⁴ The spokesman also stated that the operational assessment of the launcher prototype would be delayed from late 2023 (early FY24) to late 2024 (early FY25).⁵ In October 2023, an Army spokesman explained that the launcher prototypes were now planned to be delivered by December.⁶ These delays could potentially push the date by which soldiers are scheduled to field the air defense system, from FY26 to later.

We think better understanding alternative options that could fill the defense gap created by the delivery delays in IFPC Inc 2 is essential. For example, the United States has sent to Ukraine multiple National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS), which, according to the Pentagon, “have been extremely successful.”⁷ Unfortunately, the Army has not provided a similarly effective system to Guam while IFPC Inc 2 struggles with the first delivery of launcher prototypes and faces an unclear future as to when it will become operational.

On occasion, the Army has stated that the Patriot Advanced Capability - 3 (PAC-3) system could serve as an alternative. However, the lack of systems and the extraordinary missile cost (\$4.1 million per round) make this an unaffordable solution for the defense of Guam against potentially hundreds of inbound cruise missiles. We are also concerned that the Army is almost a year late in responding to Section 1704 entitled “Assessment of Requirements and Acquisition Objectives for Patriot Air and Missile Defense Battalions” included in the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263).

In light of such these troubling deficiencies in the defense of Guam, we respectfully request that you provide answers to the following questions: by December 1, 2023.

1. As briefed to the Committees in April 2023, is IFPC Inc 2 initial capability on time to be delivered by the fourth quarter of FY23? If not, when will this capability be delivered?

³ Ashley Roque, “Army delays IFPC Inc 2 program operational assessment to ‘early’ FY25,” *Breaking Defense*, June 1, 2023, <https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/army-delays-ifpc-inc-2-program-operational-assessment-to-early-fy25/>.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ Ashley Roque, “Slide to the right: Army now predicting first Enduring Shield launcher delivery by year’s end,” *Breaking Defense*, Oct. 17, 2023, <https://breakingdefense.com/2023/10/slide-to-the-right-army-now-predicting-first-enduring-shield-launcher-delivery-by-years-end/>.

⁷ Jim Garamone, “U.S., Allies Work to Supply Ukraine Air Defense Needs,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, Nov. 29, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3231049/us-allies-work-to-supply-ukraine-air-defense-needs>.

2. Is the Army still scheduled to receive all 16 launcher prototypes and 60 fieldable interceptor prototypes by March 2024? If not, what is the new expected date of receipt?
3. An Army program spokesman stated that the operational assessment of the launcher prototype would be delayed to early FY25. Considering this delay, is IFPC Inc 2 still scheduled to be fielded by FY26? If not, when does the Army expect that it will be fielded?
4. The program spokesman also stated that the delays in deliveries of the Dynetics launcher prototypes were due to supply chain issues. Where are the supply chains for materials used to make the launcher prototypes based? Are any such supply chains based in China? What is the nature of the supply chain issues that are causing the delays?
5. What is the Army's plan to provide adequate cruise missile defenses for Guam before IFPC Inc 2 becomes fully operational?
 - a. Does the Army have any plans to procure NASAMS or deploy Iron Dome Defensive Systems-Army for Guam as a "gap filler"? If not, please explain the reason.
 - b. Has the Army discussed with the Navy whether the Navy will be tethered to Guam in the employment of the Aegis missile system until the Army can deliver IFPC Inc 2?
 - c. Two key allies in the region – Japan and Australia – both have significant land-based cruise missile defense capabilities. Integrating their air defense assets with U.S. systems could provide timely and effective air defenses for Guam. Would the Army support such integration?

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to "investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party's economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States" under H. Res. 11.

To make arrangements to deliver a response, please contact Select Committee staff at (202) 226-9678.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and prompt reply.

Sincerely,



Mike Gallagher
Chairman
Select Committee on China